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In order to appraise the current terrorist and force protection threat against US 
Naval forces, trust in the creation of such countermeasures must be grounded in 
knowledge creation and management theories and practices.  The anti-terrorism and force 
protection (AT/FP) problem involves identifying the different threats associated with 
particular global regions and then disseminating those threats to the appropriate decision 
makers.  This requires that leaders gain knowledge about these regions and craft 
appropriate warnings and plans.  The Multi-Threat Alert Center is being established as 
the hub for this knowledge flow process.  Its organization and mission will be critical for 
the effectiveness of any US response to AT/FP.  By using theories such as the 
“Knowledge Management Life Cycle Models” and concepts such as “absorptive 
capacity,” Multi-Threat Alert Center (MTAC) planners can better address the larger 
problem of knowledge creation and management.  This is accomplished by ensuring that 
processes found in the AT/FP plan support knowledge flow and help increase the 
absorptive capacity of the organization.  This paper identifies key knowledge creation 
and flow concepts, outlines a proposed AT/FP system, and applies the theory to this 
application.  This thesis is intended to spur further research in the knowledge 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Historically, naval vessels have sought refuge in ports and harbors when 
conditions or conflicts at sea were too demanding.  The mindset of many naval 
commanders is that harbors and ports offer a greater sense of force protection and 
security.  This strategic mindset has often led to terrific naval disasters throughout 
history.  The sneak attack on Pearl Harbor nearly obliterated the US Navy Pacific Fleet at 
the beginning of World War II.  US warships were confined to an environment that 
offered little naval advantage and so were “sitting ducks.”  The masterminds of the 
bombing of the USS COLE in Yemen counted on this myth when they orchestrated the 
successful attack on that US destroyer when it came to rest in a harbor.  Ship 
commanders are well aware that many threats are associated with pulling into port or 
mooring outside of any country.  The mere immobility of the ships and their inability to 
use the full range of fire control and weapons systems put them on the defensive.  When 
times of crisis arise regionally or globally, US Navy ships generally leave ports and 
mooring stations immediately, for it is on the high seas that the United States has 
dominance and greater situational awareness.  Radar, sonar, and other sensing equipment 
networked together allow US commanders the ability to ‘see’ the enemy.  The US naval 
force is unmatched in, on, and above the seas, but that is not where US vulnerability is 
most prominent.  Port visits are needed to serve US foreign diplomacy, maintain or 
strengthen relations with other countries, strengthen military ties to allied nations, gain 
supplies, perform maintenance, and boost crew morale.  The US Navy will continue to 
visit foreign ports and will have to adapt to the regional threats associated with port visits.  
The US government must develop a solid force protection network that provides the 
ship’s decision makers with the ability to make sound decisions based on an accurate 
threat assessment of a particular region. 
When US Naval forces begin preparations for a port visit, the visiting command’s 
Force Protection Officer (FPO) receives the latest threat assessment from Naval Criminal 
Investigative Services’ (NCIS) agents and other intelligence agencies stationed in the 
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specified region.  The FPO is charged with developing the force protection plan for the 
command while visiting the port.  Using the information provided, the assessment he or 
she makes helps determine the course of action (COA) followed during the visit.  
Therefore, the knowledge relayed to the FPO must be as complete as possible.  NCIS has 
recognized the need to better represent the threat level of any region that a naval force 
enters.  As the Internet becomes more widely used onboard ships, the ability to readily 
update information, chat about local conditions with NCIS agents, email other FPO on 
sister ships, and exchange information and knowledge is greatly enhanced.  This network 
can provide additional information and guidance to FPO so that proper precautions and 
training scenarios are taken before the ship arrives in the harbor.  Instead of using a hard 
copy printout of an intelligence report, the FPO has the ability to network with agents and 
counterparts alike to ensure that their questions are answered.  This networked 
organizational structure allows it greater flexibility in giving meaningful 
recommendations and in issuing a more informed COA.  Although the current system 
keeps our commanders updated with intelligence and information, this ‘information 
system’ must transition into a ‘knowledge flow system’ in order to best serve the 
command’s force protection efforts. 
The “fog of war” has confused military commanders throughout history.  Even in 
an age where sensing capabilities and processing power are widely available, this “fog” 
has not completely lifted.  It is a worthwhile and valiant effort to use technological 
capabilities in an effort to help “lift this fog of war”, but our national military leadership 
should not count on this alone.  History is replete with examples of how militaries have 
adopted new technology and maintained old concepts of operations with the expectation 
that the technology alone would solve a problem.  In the past this combination of the new 
with the old did not always yield adequate solutions.  For example, the invention of the 
telegraph allowed for instantaneous communication over great distances in the mid 
1800s.  Yet this great communication advancement did not reach its full potential as a 
command and control (C2) structure until the end of the Civil War.  The Civil War 
dragged on partially due to the Union’s inability to effectively use the C2 capabilities of 
the telegraph and railroad.  However, President Lincoln realized the potential of this 
advancement, but needed to convince his general staff to make the organizational shift to 
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incorporate its C2 capabilities.1  Organizational modifications to existing structures along 
with transformational changes in some infrastructures and doctrines are always needed in 
order to manage properly the increased flow of information.  US forces are forever in 
need of a reliable decision support knowledge based system that gives its commanders 
the upper hand in the information war surrounding indigenous port regions.  The 
intelligence organizations charged with constructing the knowledge surrounding threat 
assessments and force protection must be organized in such a manner to take full 
advantage of technological capabilities of our time while continuing to provide the best 
support to our decision makers afloat. 
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER 
This thesis is intended to analyze the knowledge construction and flow systems 
surrounding force protection.  The problems associated with force protection are 
problems of knowledge creation, engineering, and management.  Therefore the ongoing 
dialogue and debate concerning these ideas are illustrated in problems surrounding Anti-
Terrorism and Force Protection.  Those entrusted with planning and organizing these 
systems should be familiar with current knowledge flow theories and should constantly 
appraise present systems to ensure that the Multi-Threat Alert Center (MTAC) is a useful 
means of force protection.  Although different groups could draw useful information 
from this work, it is hoped that this thesis will serve as a catalyst for future in depth 
explorations associated with the AT/FP knowledge flow system. 
Chapter II analyzes the current AT/FP knowledge system.  It highlights the roles 
of those entities that are stakeholders in this knowledge flow system.  It gives an 
introduction to the MTAC and the function that it will provide in the nation’s AT/FP 
plans.  The different entities discussed have a unique relationship with each other.  Each 
contributes to the successful construction of a sufficient AT/FP plan.   The final section 
of this chapter speculates on the problems that could arise given a poorly implemented 
system. 
                                                 
1  By coupling the railroad and the telegraph, troops could be commanded to attack the South in many 
different areas at the same time.  Technology on its own does not add much benefit to anything without 
manner in how it is used.  See Lincoln and the Telegraph for a thorough documentary on the rise of the 
telegraph into military operations. 
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 In Chapter III, current knowledge flow theories are reviewed in order to lay the 
theoretical framework for the analysis section of the paper.  It highlights works from 
knowledge experts such as Dr. Nonaka and Dr. Nissen and examines important 
knowledge flow principles.  Drs. Zahra and George’s concept of a knowledge system’s 
absorptive capacity is also introduced.  The different areas discussed in this chapter 
provide the analytical framework that is used in Chapter 4.   
Chapter IV reviews a proposal of a AT/FP knowledge flow system.  This system 
is then analyzed under different knowledge flow theories.  It examines each of the 
knowledge theories, applying them to the AT/FP.  The final section of this chapter 
discusses the proposed system’s absorptive capacity and its importance for organization. 
The last chapter reviews the analysis of the fourth chapter and includes 
recommendations for the force protection planners.  This section is offered to those who 
work with the MTAC to spur future research in the delineated areas.   
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II. ANTI-TERRORISM/ FORCE PROTECTION KNOWLEDGE 
SYSTEM 
A.   STAKEHOLDERS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
Different groups and organizations have vested interests in the AT/FP problem.  
These different governmental beneficial gains are summarized briefly below.  They 
interact with each other to create a socio-technological system that helps to equip unit 
decision makers with the most current knowledge and threat assessment possible.  It is 
important to note the make-up of these different entities and their missions since their 
inputs into the overall force protection system are critical to knowledge construction and 
management.  Each contributes to the creation, modification, and exchange of knowledge 
that ultimately gives a unit’s commander the proper threat assessment of a given port 
region.   
1. Multi-Threat Alert Center 
NCIS is working towards the establishment of the Multi-Threat Alert Center 
(MTAC).  This center, to be located in Washington D.C., will take data and information 
from social, political, environmental, physical, and military sources to formulate threat 
assessments for particular regions.  Groups such as NCIS agents, local law enforcement 
officials, other US intelligence agencies, and the media will gather such data and 
information.  The fusion of this information into a central location will give regional 
subject matter experts within the MTAC the ability to analyze and formulate more 
specific threat assessments of a region.  Using statistical data and modeling certain 
patterns in a society, the MTAC could generate different reports to better capture the 
knowledge of a particular environment.  This presentation of knowledge is intended to 
give those decision makers afloat better threat assessments with which to make effective 
force protection COA.  These reports will focus on disseminating the explicit knowledge 
gained about a particular region to those who need it the most.  The makeup of the actual 
internal organization will not be discussed in this study.  The MTAC’s organization and 
makeup currently is undergoing a diagnostic testing phase.   
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The actual product generated from the MTAC is still being debated.  One idea 
being suggested involves fusing this information and knowledge into a network based 
product.  The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) is currently working on new projects that 
could yield such products.  For example, an XML networked-based product with a three-
dimensional graphical interface would allow the FPO the ability to “move” through the 
virtual environment.  He or she will be able to view the ship’s position from different 
angles, atop buildings, from the air, and below the surface.  Areas of concern, such as 
political party headquarters, religious buildings and sites, and areas of recent protests 
could be highlighted and/or tagged with certain relevant information.  FPO can access the 
site and gather up to the minute reports, graphs, pictures, models, threat assessments and 
news updates.  Although these ideas remain, NPS has already viewed some products that 
capture this 3-D virtual physical representation.2  The possibility of expanding this 
particular concept is discussed in the “Future Research” portion of the last chapter. 
2. NCIS Agents 
In collaboration with local law enforcement, governmental agencies, news media, 
and other intelligence assets, NCIS agents will compile and store the information they 
gain about a particular part of the port region.  Because of their geographic location, they 
will be able to work with the local US embassy and State Department officials, other US 
intelligence groups, as well as different open-source connections.  Human intelligence 
(HUMINT) is a reliable and trustworthy source of information, and these agents should 
be viewed as a reliable source of tacit knowledge.  They are not tasked with processing 
and analyzing the data and information as they gather it, but they are definitely an 
integral part of the knowledge acquisition process.  Their inputs about the credibility of 
certain sources and other measures of confidence they can convey are necessary for 
properly equipping the MTAC analysts with reliable information.  Over secure lines of 
communication using encryption and other data assurance measures, this information will 
be transmitted to the regional experts and analysts at the MTAC.  The analysts will then 
                                                 
2 James Harney, Web-Based 3D Reconstruction of Scenarios for Limited Objective Experiments, to be 




use first-hand accounts of events, reporting, and recommendations to construct the 
knowledge product for that region.   
The regionally based NCIS agents are also an integral part of the evaluation of the 
port visit as well. Because they geographically remain in a region after a port visit is 
completed, they can assist the FPO and MTAC analysts in formulating after-action 
reports.  They should primarily be tasked with preparing the environmental conditions 
form that helps define the different dynamics within the region.  These agents are integral 
to the commencement of the knowledge creation and evaluation process, because they are 
in direct contact with the everyday dynamics within the region.  This is a high value asset 
and the utilization of the HUMINT capabilities associated with them should not be 
unexploited.   
3. Force Protection Officers 
Each command has someone or some entity charged with the protection of that 
command during a port visit, typically the FPO.  Ultimately the Commander of the 
visiting staff or crew is responsible for the welfare and safety of all those under his or her 
command.  Threat assessments can come from many different avenues such as the 
MTAC, the State Department, NCIS, immediate superiors, and the public media.  An 
FPO’s job begins with gathering intelligence and threat assessments from these sources 
and recommending to the Commander a COA most appropriate to the perceived threat.  
The more knowledge that is imparted to the FPO beforehand the better informed and 
educated the sailors and marines are before the visit.3  He or she can then develop 
training scenarios and evolutions that will increase the crew’s awareness and 
effectiveness against these outlined threats.  The proposed COA to certain threats are 
honed for perfection and the overall situational awareness of the vessel is improved.   
During the visitation, crewmembers and watch-standers constantly survey the port 
environment, observing and reporting all unique events to the FPO and the command’s 
leadership.  Modifications to existing COA are issued and documentation of threats 
                                                 
3 This does not mean that the more information a FPO has, the more informed he or she becomes.  
With all the data and information available about a certain port environment, it would not take the FPO 
long to suffer information overload.  The processing of such information must be done outside of the ship 
and fused into knowledge.  Thus only in a knowledge product would the “more equals better” function be 
applicable.   
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encountered is made.  FPO and officers aboard the visiting vessel can be in contact with 
the locally based NCIS agents to secure direct input into the port dynamics.  As the 
duration of the port visit increases the officers and crew of the visiting command become 
more acclimated to the environment and have a greater knowledge of the port’s state of 
affairs. 
The agents charged with collecting data and information must be well networked 
in the region’s society.  NCIS agents rely on personal ties, friendships, and business 
dealings to gather data and information.  This also carries a weight of confidence as well.  
Trust of those from whom our agents gather information is ultimately dependent upon the 
individual agents’ assessments.  Becoming socially networked in a given society takes 
time, but the information capital that can be gained is critical for producing an accurate 
threat assessment.  Other social networks that will form in this information system 
emerge between the agents themselves, the analysts at the MTAC, and the FPO and their 
ISIC’s at sea.  Personal relations that form within defense chat rooms or from the 
exchange of emails or phone calls help to establish trust amongst the AT/FP team.  
Although the actors in this system are doctrinally on the same team given the mission of 
AT/FP, the personal ties that form can add to the development of a more complete 
knowledge of the battlespace.   
4. Immediate Superior in Command 
Even though the MTAC ought to be incorporated into the knowledge flow system 
of force protection, they do not and should not have the authority to direct tactical 
actions.  The knowledge product that the center generates will be viewed both by the 
visiting command and that command’s immediate superior in command (ISIC) as a 
recommendation or assessment of conditions.  One of the roles of any ISIC is to be kept 
informed of the units under its command.  Using command by negation or decentralized 
C2, the visiting unit is charged with developing the COA for the port visit.  The ISIC, 
having access to the same knowledge product from the MTAC, will either agree or 
modify that plan in accordance with its guidelines.  The authority and responsibility of 
the operational and tactical functions the ISIC’s units should not be modified given the 
inclusion of the MTAC into the knowledge flow system.  The ISIC remains active 
throughout the port visit assisting in the C2 of the visiting units.  Although ISIC will vary 
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throughout the Navy, their role in the operational chain of command is not affected by the 
inclusion of the MTAC in to AT/FP planning. 
B. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MTAC 
Too often leaders and managers of today strive to fix many problems with a 
predominately technological solution.  The planners and visionaries of the systems 
surrounding AT/FP and the MTAC should be aware of the consequences of such 
ineffective trends.  The inclusions of information technology (IT) systems such as 
databases, word processors, electronic filing, and other shareware suites might aid in the 
improvement of certain information systems, but should not be relied upon as a complete 
knowledge–work progress or as an instance of a knowledge management system.4  The 
terms “data warehouse” and “database” rightly suggest functions of utility and data 
processing but do not of themselves generate certain knowledge.  It is the interaction of 
these data and information systems with context, analysis, and cognition that yields the 
construction of certain knowledge.   
Once data and information are collected, it must safely get to the MTAC in order 
to be deciphered and assimilated.  Data and information will flow from different regions 
to this centralized location before being disseminated to the FPO.  How given 
information flows to the MTAC and from the MTAC to the ship and what form it takes 
can bring about some vulnerabilities to the transfer and dissemination processes.  
“Critical national infrastructures for power, telecommunications, and transportation, as 
well as crucial commercial databases and information systems for finance and health, 
remain vulnerable to computer hackers and cyberterrorists.”5  There is still a tendency, 
when trying to set up a “network organization” or “network information system” to make 
it hierarchical.  Because the proposed organization of the information flow with regards 
to the MTAC centralizes all information, it is vulnerable to certain attacks.  Therefore the 
flow of information through a central node carries with it the certain vulnerabilities of a 
logical star network.   This idea stems from the technical designs of a common client-
server network.  A break or disruption in the communications between regional 
                                                 
4 T.H.Davenport, and L. Prusak, Working Knowledge:  How Organizations Manage what they Know 
(Boston, MA:  Harvard Business School Press, 1998). 
5 Arquilla, John, David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars:  The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, 
Santa Monica, Calif.:  RAND, P 314, 2001. 
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intelligence agencies and the MTAC will isolate the FPO without his or her needed 
intelligence and knowledge product.  Peer to Peer (P2P) networks allow for a “multi-
connected star” network structure similar to an all-channel network.  In designing the 
MTAC’s information system, the concerns of single points of failure need to be evaluated 
to ensure that path dependency does not occur. This will ensure that the FPO is not solely 
reliant on the MTAC for the final vital knowledge product.  The technological security of 
this information system is only as good as the route that the information takes to get to 
and from the MTAC and as secure as the encryption used to protect that information.  
The security of the server in which the final XML product resides determines whether the 
ship will actually be able to use the intended product or not.  Communication should 
readily pass between the NCIS agents on shore and the FPO afloat.  P2P networking 
should be incorporated into this process.  This will provide an added measure of security 
to insure that the information flows freely from the MTAC to the decision makers.  A 
highly robust and dynamic network will ensure that information and knowledge is 
imparted to those entities that need it. 
C. SUMMARY 
The common goals of force protection and US national policy are cohesive 
principles that favor multi-hub or all-channel networks.  Communication between the 
ship’s decision makers and the regional agents can be carried out in chat rooms, email, 
and message boards.  The initiative of FPO and other officers and staffs instinctively 
joins people in networks in order to better serve the common mission of force protection.  
The belief in the nation’s safety doctrinally joins servicemen together in this fight for 
battlespace knowledge supremacy.  FPO on different ships can share ideas, and agents 
can contact their counterparts in other regions for new ideas, COA, or tactics.  This 
collective fleet mindset is the natural instigator of social networks.  The nation’s forces 
do not need to resort to a “leaderless” network to carry out its missions.  Already FPO 
and commanders rely too heavily upon the intelligence gathered from land-based 
intelligence agencies.  Distributed groups, such as al ‘Qaida’s loosely connected network, 
tend to favor the extremist groups who aspire to inspire dissidents from around the world 
to take part in acts favorable to their cause.   
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The use of networking principles can move US naval forces closer to constructing 
knowledge of the port environment and the threats associated with it.  The information 
systems that control the flow across the actors associated with AT/FP need to be tailored 
to minimize the threat of disruption.  The ability to directly access the intelligence 
sources in the port region will greatly help the FPO and commanders to formulate force 
protection decisions.  Ultimately, the knowledge flow system should generate proper 
training, education, and tactical action prior to entrance into a region.  The success of 
future port visits rests on the ability to keep ships safe when they are most exposed to 
danger.  Contrary to what many believe today, ships have far more challenges in port 
than on the high seas.  The proliferation of short and medium range missiles, hypersonic 
missiles, and low-tech attacks such as swimmers and disgruntled citizens, have made the 
port environment the ultimate battleground.  Ship commanders cannot afford to go into 
this highly complex environment without being made properly aware of the threats 
associated with it.  Thus, the MTAC will fulfill a vital role in the protection of US Naval 
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III. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS 
A. THE KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT LIFE CYCLE MODELS 
There is a subtle but distinct difference between information and knowledge.  
Information superiority has its place in operations used to defend our country.  Electronic 
warfare, information warfare, and jamming are some options a refined military has at its 
disposal.  These tools target the “bits” and flow of communication and are more technical 
and quantitative in nature.  The task for AT/FP must be more focused on knowledge 
construction and knowledge management.  Formulating a comprehensive understanding 
or knowledge of a region assists decision makers with making accurate threat 
assessments.  This problem is complex because it has many variables and resides in a 
dynamic environment. The Knowledge Management Life Cycle Models help codify these 
different ideas and put a framework around the AT/FP problem.   
1. Knowledge Defined 
Knowledge by itself is not to be viewed as something that is static and 
unchanging (i.e., absolute truth).  For the use in this study, knowledge is defined as “a 
dynamic human process of justifying personal or organizational belief toward the ‘truth.’6  
This definition by Nonaka suggests a more subjective and dynamic view of knowledge 
which is an ongoing interaction of brainpower with technical information systems.  
Knowledge cannot be separated from human cognition, and so cannot exist solely in a 
technical system.  However, it can utilize in a particular situation and under specific 
circumstances or conditions.  This is possible since certain forms of knowledge are 
relative and environmentally specific.  Knowledge can also be viewed as incorporating a 
dynamic process of necessary modification as it encounters new information and 
cognition.  Therefore, knowledge is relatively incomplete and contextually potential.  
Knowledge as a transitory process must rely upon its foundational surety as it moves 
towards what it does not yet grasp.   
                                                 
6 I.Nonaka, and T. Nishiguchi.  Knowledge Emergence.  New York, New York.  Oxford University 
Press INC.  2001.  
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Knowledge can be divided into two distinct types:  explicit and tacit knowledge.  
Explicit knowledge is that understanding that is gained from academic research and is 
defined by formulas, definitions, or other unambiguous expressions.  Because of its well-
documented structure, it is more easily expressed and transmitted because of its 
somewhat ‘static’ or defined nature.  Therefore, explicit knowledge should be 
accompanied by environmental and conditional contexts in order to be considered 
complete.  Tacit knowledge is harder to acquire and is specifically dependent upon 
human cognition and reason.  It emerges from an entity’s engagement with practical 
experience.  It yields practical operational experience or specific “know how.”7  This type 
of knowledge resides in a person or organization’s practices or processes.   It is more 
difficult to transfer or explain due to the manner in which it is defined.  Tacit knowledge 
is the operationalization of explicit knowledge whether intended or not.  It must be noted 
that knowledge does not have to be strictly labeled as either tacit or explicit.  Each kind 
of knowledge can be defined as ‘more tacit’ or ‘more explicit’ because it may have some 
proportion of both.  This point is discussed in the “Knowledge Creation” section of this 
chapter. 
The information and knowledge of a port environment that a command gathers 
depends upon the duration of the port visit.  By the end of the port visit, the command, 
especially the FPO, commanders, and intelligence agents, has a greater understanding of 
the region than they had prior to the visit.  Before a ship or a command enters a region, it 
gains mostly explicit knowledge from the MTAC and other agencies.  This explicit 
knowledge is used to educate the officers and familiarize them with the region.  Yet first-
hand accounts and events (tacit knowledge) also directly influence the tactical decisions 
that fleet commanders must make.   Because of the many different aspects of a port 
environment and its dynamic nature, this knowledge must be used concurrently with 
explicit knowledge to have a more complete understanding of the threats associated with 
that region.  As a result of positive and negative encounters made during the visit, all 
force protection personnel have a better understanding of the port environment and the 
subsequent courses of action.  These processes and COA that were implemented were 
                                                 
7 I. Nonaka.  “The Knowledge-Creating Company.”  Harvard Business Review on Knowledge 
Management.  Harvard Business School Press.  1998. 
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either validated or were proved inadequate.   As the command compiles the “lessons 
learned” from the port visit, it attempts to make explicit what it learned.  The command’s 
tacit knowledge must somehow be archived or shared with future visiting commands so 
that the flow of knowledge does not rely solely on an explicit knowledge base.  The 
processes of gathering tacit knowledge tend to create an ever broadening explicit 
knowledge base, because explicit knowledge can be stored and be more easily 
transmitted.  Thus the process of converting tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge is a 
key function to the creation of knowledge superiority.   
An example may be seen in the model taken from a journal article on the “U.S. 
Navy Battle Group Theater Transition Process (BGTTP)8.” Figure 1 shows the potential 
gain that could occur given an ideal knowledge flow system.  The knowledge 
management product from the MTAC must be combined with a knowledge flow 
generated by the visit in order to maximize the gains of this process.  The mission and 
goals of the MTAC and force protection knowledge flow system should aim at 
minimizing the loss in knowledge occurring at the transition point of the graph below.  
 
Figure 1.   Knowledge Growth Over Time 
As the graph reveals, there is a gradual increase in explicit knowledge as time 
increases.  Context based reports are generated on board the ship and by intelligence 
                                                 
8 E. Oxendine, and M. E. Nissen,  “Knowledge Process and System Design for the Carrier Battle 
Group,”  Knowledge and Innovation:  Journal of the KMCI, Vol 1, No 3.  April 15, 2001.  See also M.E. 
Nissen, Facilitating Naval Knowledge Flow, Naval Postgraduate School, July, 2001. 
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agents ashore.  These ‘lessons learned’ contributions broaden the ever-growing explicit 
knowledge base.  This graph, however, does not illustrate the fact that certain knowledge 
is restricted by the environment or context in which it is used.  Because the environment 
can shift or evolve, the explicit knowledge that is sought after in force protection may 
actually diminish.  Certain established norms of means of organized practices might 
change fundamentally, and therefore could challenge previous knowledge of an 
environmental context.  Sudden changes in the environment, like the terrorist events of 
September 11th, may even cause the knowledge base to be questioned9.  The explicit 
knowledge base function is not linear nor is it necessarily constantly enhanced. The 
environmental scope of explicit knowledge and the absorptive capacity of the 
organizations involved in force protection determine the level of knowledge gained.  
Therefore, the explicit knowledge base may be seriously threatened.  It must be noted that 
declines in explicit knowledge and the possible need to adjust it is not necessarily 
undesired.  Such can generate a change in the US’s AT/FP mindset or environmental 
conditions of a region. 
2. Knowledge Management 
Knowledge management can be viewed as a collection of processes that work 
either independently or together to support the construction or flow of knowledge by 
partitioning the knowledge flow system into specific processes.  Definitions and identities 
can be placed on these contributing processes.  The functionality of these processes can 
be overlapping, separate, concurrent, and even recursive.  Many researchers in the 
knowledge management field have attempted to capture this in a Knowledge 
Management Life Cycle Model (KMLCM).  Although the names associated with the 
processes or phases are not the same, the flow through the model follows a very similar 
path to the final end product of knowledge.  Table 1 lists the major life cycle models with 




                                                 
9 This is to say that a paradigm shift can occur.  
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Table 1.   Knowledge Management Life Cycle Models10 
 
Model Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 
Nissen Capture Organize Formalize Distribute Apply  
Despres and Chauvel Create Map/bundle Store Share/transfer Reuse Evolve 
Gartner Group Create Organize Capture Access Use  
Davenport & Prusak Generate  Codify Transfer   
Amalgamated Create Organize Formalize Distribute Apply Evolve 
 
Although this paper does not address the great complexities associated with each 
of the above individual phases, it must be stated that each of them has scalable 
granularity associated dependent on the dimension it is to be used.  For example, in the 
third phase, where the formalization, storing, codifying and so forth occur, this process is 
different according to the entity using it.  It will be different, sometimes drastically, 
depending whether a sole person, team, or organization is engaged in the process.  A life 
cycle is a continuously running process of events that leads to an end product of 
knowledge.  It also should be noted that references to the life cycle model in this paper 
use the amalgamated terms.  Potential gains for research into these phases and the 
implications it could have are discussed in the ‘Future Research’ portion of the 
conclusion chapter.  
3. Knowledge Creation 
Knowledge is molded into different forms by those who use it.  At certain times, a 
person or entity has a combination of tacit with explicit knowledge.  Because knowledge 
is a dynamic flow of different processes, different means are associated with moving 
knowledge between the tacit and explicit forms.  A knowledge set could have explicit 
aspects attributed to it while remaining mostly tacit.  In thinking about knowledge, it is 
helpful to realize the tacit and explicit nature of certain sets of knowledge.  This will help 
those charged with knowledge management to establish efficient knowledge flow 
systems.  However, the most complete knowledge of a certain subject will incorporate the 
many different processes like socialization, externalization, combination, and 
internalization (SECI Process).  Figure 2 illustrates by what means knowledge is moved 
in order to transform between and within the different forms.   
                                                 
10 M.E. Nissen, M. Kamel, K. Sengupta; “Integrated Analysis and Design of Knowledge Systems and 
Processes,” Information Resources Management Journal, Idea Group Publishing, Jan-Mar, 2000, Page 30. 
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Figure 2.   The SECI Process 
It takes interaction among different groups of people in multiple situations to 
perpetuate the movement of knowledge between the two categories.11  It is important to 
note that creation or construction of knowledge must mingle between these two forms in 
order to be more useful.  Either pure explicit or pure tacit knowledge alone will not yield 
a complete understanding.  The formal research and knowledge management associated 
with the explicit type must be challenged and tested by the practical factors that exist in 
the tacit type.  This SECI process leads to one dimension of knowledge only.  In it fuller 
knowledge can be secured from a host of interactions and incremental co-inherence.  
Knowledge is not a single dimensional object; knowledge can be complex, codified, and 
applied in multidimensional ways.  The study of knowledge creation and management as 
the theoretical basis for analyzing the AT/FP organization demands that knowledge be 
placed within specific frameworks.  Further studies using the different dimensions of 
knowledge are discussed in the last chapter of this paper. 
                                                 
11 See Nonaka’s example of the Osaka-based Matsushita Electric Company’s automation of the bread-
making machine in “The Knowledge-Creating Company” article. 
I. Nonaka.  “The Knowledge-Creating Company.”  Harvard Business Review on Knowledge 




B. USE OF KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS 
The ability to disseminate a perceived ‘true’ threat is crucial to the government’s 
ability to protect visiting commands.  Knowledge based systems (KBS) will become the 
expert tools upon which the fleet will rely on to transmit not only force protection 
knowledge, but also battlespace knowledge.  KBS are not to be confused with data or 
information based systems.  As stated above, because of its dynamic and cognitive 
nature, knowledge is conceptually separate from data and information.  The use of KBS 
only can take form after a sufficient system capable of transferring tacit knowledge into 
explicit knowledge is in place.  Force protection organization cannot be solved 
completely by technical means, but also requires a human element.  The ultimate goal of 
KBS in force protection is to store explicit knowledge in a manner that allows it to be 
applied directly.   
KBS thus involves a new way of thinking about information based systems and 
database management systems.  These new systems require that organizations, 
governments, and militaries approach knowledge management innovatively.  The United 
States has a plan for its armed forces by the year 2020.12  To implement this vision, the 
US Navy relies heavily on the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as a force 
multiplier.  However, that US Naval forces are able to access the Internet does not mean 
that they are “networked”13.  Connection capability does not ensure that networking will 
be used effectively.  It is the functionality of the fleet as a networked force and the end 
goal of mission accomplishment using these means that determines whether a force is 
network centric or not.  The KBS used in force protection must be environmentally and 
contextually indexed in order to produce sound explicit references.  It should be able to 
archive, organize, and retrieve relevant knowledge providing MTAC workers with the 
                                                 
12 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Vision 2020.  June 2000. 
13 Actually, the US Navy has led the way operationally in becoming a networked force.  The extensive 
use of radio and radar since the Second World War has given naval commanders the ability to construct a 
larger picture of the battlespace.  Over the horizon aircraft and the introduction of LINK and Aegis 
equipment has provided the sensing capabilities to pictorially display the battlespace. 
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accessibility to such pertinent resources. Ultimately, these KBS will be the socio-
technical ‘brain’ of the AT/FP organization, storing the trials, lessons, and contexts of 
passed events.  The proper planning and engineering of the human element involved in 
these systems is critical to the robustness of the MTAC. 
C. PROCESS ANALYSIS AND REPRESENTATION 
The KMLCM provides a framework in which to study an application.  The model 
and concepts surrounding knowledge construction and management can be analyzed 
according to general categories or particular situations.  A broad epistemological 
approach discerns different ideas, models, and discussions that emerge from a situation.  
A more in-depth study discloses the particular processes, practices, inputs, and local 
variables that contribute to knowledge construction or flow.  Each of these scopes 
provides useful vantage points from which to gain insight.  Contextual or environment 
analysis focuses on the relative nature of knowledge.  The importance of the environment 
and conditions with which knowledge exists helps further define and codify it.  The 
following general analytical frameworks provide a structure from which different 
understandings of knowledge creation and flow can be generated. 
1. Horizontal Scope Analysis 
Describing knowledge as explicit or tacit contributes to the overall increase in the 
knowledge base.  The four processes included in the SECI model reveal knowledge in a 
dynamic self-improving state.  The interaction within a knowledge type is just as 
important as the conversion from one type of knowledge to the other.  The examination 
of the tacit to explicit, explicit to explicit, explicit to tacit, and tacit to tacit knowledge 
flows of a system has the potential to yield a new understanding about system entities, 
processes, and practices.  An appraisal of a system under this framework yields which 
players or processes help complete each of the four functions delineated by Nonaka.  The 
MTAC and force protection processes or practices that do not aid in the execution or 
completion of one of these four processes must be analyzed in detail to ensure that they 




2. Vertical Scope Analysis 
Nissen organizes the KMLCM processes into either a supportive or performative 
role (see Figure 3).  The phases that are listed as Class I processes are supportive in 
nature, and are most commonly used in conjunction with IT support.  The functions they 
perform in the knowledge management infrastructure generally assist the people in the 
organization.  The remaining Class II processes are performative in nature because of 
their dynamic interaction with people.  These are the systems that perform knowledge 
management.  In conducting a vertical analysis of a knowledge management system, the 
focuses would be on the two major classes of processes and an in-depth look at the 
systems contributing to each of the six functions.  Such an analysis would delineate a 
whole subgroup of functions with particular inputs, outputs, resources, and constraints 
that are unique to the case study.  The knowledge creation and management process is 
directly affected by the quality of the many different information systems supporting it.  
Each information system and IT program behind each knowledge management process 
should be specified in such system analysis.  Such an analysis also would indicate the 
level of confidence associated with a particular process.   
 




                                                 
14 M.E. Nissen, Facilitating Naval Knowledge Flow, Naval Postgraduate School, July, 2001. Page 6. 
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3. Contextual Analysis 
Human knowledge is contextual.  The analysis of knowledge flow systems, 
demands that system planners and organizers study the context that qualifies and creates 
fuller knowledge.  Knowledge that is generated without reference to context is vague and 
incomplete.  It is difficult to communicate relevant knowledge to others because it is 
vulnerable to distortion due to the different contexts with which people associate it. Users 
are unable to interpret situations and apply knowledge without first examining the 
relative circumstances and environmental conditions of the subject.  Nonaka concludes, 
“Thus what makes sense in one context can change or even lose its meaning when 
communicated to people in a different context.15”  Because knowledge is a dynamic 
process and since it is used in a flow system, skewed-knowledge continues to be distorted 
as it moves through an organization.  If the system is capable of interpreting knowledge 
within a contextual framework, then the import will have been externalized and thus 
made explicit.  Contextual analysis is essential to the process of transforming tacit 
knowledge into explicit knowledge.  Every effort should be made to ensure that 
contextual distortion does not occur before it is made explicit.  
Information without cognition will not contribute to an entity’s knowledge base.  
The KMLCM provides a spectrum to categorize the major functions of knowledge flow.  
Although knowledge can be used at any phase in the KMLCM, understanding in any 
phase requires context. The creation of knowledge requires the combination of new 
information and old knowledge through cognition.  This human grasp of old and still 
relevant knowledge and its relation to new information yields an updated knowledge 
base.  Thus, the application of this new knowledge must be used under the same or 
similar conditions it was formed from in order for it to be constructive.  The figure below 
illustrates the appropriate application of new knowledge with context. 
 
                                                 
15 I. Nonaka.  “The Knowledge-Creating Company.”  Harvard Business Review on Knowledge 
Management.  Harvard Business School Press.  1998.  Page 39. 
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Figure 4.   Inclusion of Context with the Application of New Knowledge 
 
D. KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS AND ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY 
1.   Absorptive Capacity Overview 
The knowledge management concept of absorptive capacity (ACAP) is useful in 
analyzing systems and organizations.  This construct examines how well an entity learns 
or performs in a dynamic environment.  The academic investigation of this topic is 
ongoing and definitions vary.  For this paper, ACAP is referred to as, “a dynamic 
capability pertaining to knowledge creation and utilization that enhances a firm’s ability 
to gain and sustain a competitive advantage.”16  If an organization can utilize its dynamic 
capabilities and channel them into useful functions and potential gains, it can maximize 
its utilization of knowledge and enhance performance.  Considering ACAP in this 
manner is different from other definitions in that it is not confined to a set of skills in 
knowledge management.  It is not simply scoped to the ability of an organization to 
accept technological change nor is it entirely the learning capability of an entity.  ACAP 
involves practices and capabilities that help it become dynamic in nature.  Concentrating 
of the different dimensions that define ACAP constantly improves the organization in 
bringing in and effectively processing new knowledge. 
2. Dimensions of Absorptive Capacity 
According to Zahra and George, ACAP combines of different organizational 
capabilities that collectively give an organization or a system a competitive advantage:  
acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and exploitation.  The end result of these 
combined capabilities working together will make ACAP a dynamic capability.  The 
following sections highlight the major themes of Zahra’s and George’s definitions of the 
different dimensions of ACAP. 
a. Acquisition 
The ability to acquire new information and knowledge is a common theme 
in different studies conducted by Nonaka, Nissen, as well as Zahra and George.  Any 
organization interested in the creation and/or collection of knowledge must pay special 
attention to the processes and practices that support new knowledge and its inclusion into 
                                                 
16 S. Zahra. and G. George.  “Absorptive Capacity:  A Review, Reconceptualization, and Extension.”  
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the system.  Zahra and George indicate that the intensity, speed, and direction with which 
acquisition processes act directly influence the ACAP of an organization.  Practices that 
increase the strength and intensity of a systems knowledge acquisition effort can 
therefore lead to an increase in the ACAP of that system.  The speed with which new 
knowledge is accumulated is sometimes dependent on the prior knowledge base’s 
definition or special properties.  Often more time and energy is needed to extract 
knowledge.  Therefore systems tailored for speed that seek to acquire knowledge too 
quickly might find themselves gathering incomplete and unreliable knowledge 
conclusions.  Special attention must also be paid to the direction in which some processes 
or practices take.  Time and energy directed in skewed or dubious areas can also decrease 
the ability of the company to acquire relevant and useful information and knowledge in a 
sufficient amount of time.  Therefore, those practices that acquire and include extant 
knowledge require close scrutiny to ensure their effectiveness. 
b. Assimilation 
Once an organization has gathered new knowledge, it must interpret it in 
order to make use of it.  This process of assimilation ensures that the knowledge is 
understood by attaching special context and significance to its different segments.  Some 
time might be needed in order to acquire new knowledge if it is determined that the 
desired knowledge depends on another new set of knowledge.  Therefore the assimilation 
and acquisition processes may work together in order to generate a more complete 
understanding of and support for the knowledge within an organization.  To outside 
observers, the relevance and meaning of such acquired knowledge might not be apparent 
because of its purpose or context.  This ability to assimilate the knowledge and attach 
special contexts to it directly affects the learning and understanding of the organization.  
Some of these processes may work closely with technology in order to process and 
organize.  Best practices and processes in the assimilation of external knowledge increase 
ACAP.  The organization possesses a system that is sufficient to assimilate and thus 
make room for new knowledge flows. 
 
                                                 




The transformation process can be viewed as a foundry for an 
organization’s knowledge.  A system combines internal knowledge with the newly 
acquired external assimilated knowledge to interpret it into a new and useful product.  
Like artificial intelligence programs, knowledge has to be joined with other known 
knowledge bases in order to prove or disprove the existence of anything.  Using this 
process, an organization or system can then view the knowledge from more than one 
frame of reference.  Knowledge that can be labeled as irrelevant is discarded from the 
system and knowledge that has potential is saved.  By using different schema, a selected 
set of knowledge can take on different meanings.  In Figure 4, new information is 
combined with old knowledge through cognition.  By the knowledge with which the new 
information is processed, a new understanding could be formed.17  The ability to do this 
gives the organization the capacity to broaden its existing knowledge engineering 
practices by viewing knowledge from different vantage points. 
d. Exploitation 
Knowledge must be put to use in order to be of any value to the 
organization.  The way in which a system applies or exploits the knowledge is the final 
vocation in ACAP.  If the above process and the practices associated with them are 
successful, the measure of the system’s ACAP then resides with the exploitation or 
implementation of the knowledge.  The effective use of the refined knowledge then 
provides a test to determine if the system was able to extract the needed understandings 
from the knowledge.  The implementation of such knowledge pertains to all processes 
contributing to the use of the knowledge and can range over extended periods of time.  
Also, a byproduct of the utilization of the knowledge may be the creation of new 
knowledge to be acquired and assimilated.  Therefore this dimension of ACAP may spur 
future acquisition processes. 
 
                                                 





These theoretical frameworks provide a structured view of a knowledge 
management problem.  They specify types of knowledge, labels processes, and highlights 
the importance of contextual inclusion.  Many companies and organizations are 
investigating ACAP to see how well their own systems match up.  Applying this to 
knowledge creation and management problems provides for a structured extraction of 
valuable insights.  It assists in identifying important processes and practices as well as 
those that are not directly contributing to the knowledge flow process.  
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IV. KNOWLEDGE FLOW AND FORCE PROTECTION 
A. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT LIFE CYCLE AND FORCE 
PROTECTION  (THE SCHACHER PROPOSAL) 
The MTAC’s knowledge management product must be combined with a 
knowledge flow generated by any given port visit in order to minimize the loss in 
knowledge at the transition point (See Figure 1).   
All of the personnel involved in AT/FP play some role in the knowledge 
management life cycle.  Different force protection stakeholders, whether locally present 
or geographically removed, share phases of the KMLCM concurrently.  Ideally, the 
MTAC ideally uses its resources to provide real time threat assessments that are as 
accurate as possible.  This can be accomplished through local engagement and 
coordination of friendly sensors that feed data and information into a central processing 
center.  It is the interaction of sensing capabilities with a knowledge flow system that 
produces accurate estimations of the current environment.  All six steps of the KMLCM 
occur in some form in the knowledge system surrounding the MTAC.  The MTAC 
founders and organizers are charged with overseeing and improving each of the 
knowledge management phases.   
The Institute for Defense Systems Engineering Analysis (IDSEA) is supporting 
the MTAC planners in their development of a functioning entity.  This Monterey-based 
institute is conducting limited objective experiments (LOE) to gain a ‘lessons learned’ 
knowledge base on the many different aspects of force protection and the information and 
knowledge systems associated with it. It also serves as a foundry of fresh ideas for the 
general concern with force protection. The LOE’s conducted by IDSEA must be complex 
and detailed enough to ensure that they sufficiently challenge each of the phases 
associated with the KMLCM.  Ultimately the MTAC is a knowledge creation and 
managing system and thus takes on all of the issues surrounding this type of structure. In 
essence, it must embrace the method of critical construction in order to become the 
master of knowledge management.  Without a successful system like this in place, the 
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fleet’s decision must protect the force without the proper intelligence and knowledge 
assets. 
Gordon Schacher at the IDSEA is formulating strategy by which knowledge can 
be constructed and disseminated through the MTAC.  He heeded the advice of senior 
naval leaders who insisted that a ship’s functioning should not be stressed or hindered by 
the addition of this system.  Figure 4 illustrates the flow of knowledge from the phase of 
its construction until ultimate use as a force protection plan.  Schacher believes that an 
essential part of this system is the inclusion of pre-plans.  These plans are not meant to 
exist as particular individual solutions to certain scenarios. Therefore to avoid form-
fitting a solution to a problem this system must encourage due-diligence.  These plans 
must rely on a successful past-plan and also incorporate the new considerations and 
conditions associated with the current environment.   
 
Figure 5.   Schacher’s AT/FP Plan Development Flow Chart 
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The use of a “conditions form” during the after-action report allows for contextual 
inclusion.  That way, when it is sent to the MTAC archive, it is not only a detailed report 
highlighting new knowledge generated, it also includes relevant contextual information 
because of the environmental considerations associated with it.  This proposed system 
aims to ensure that a contextual framework is appended to the knowledge. When the 
MTAC has a new event that occurs or is preparing a product for a visiting command, it 
uses the process in Figure 4 to combine old knowledge with new information.  By taking 
old knowledge reports from the MTAC archive and combining them with new 
information and current conditions, the MTAC analysts are able to assimilate this 
knowledge.  Schacher’s system includes the “conditions” form and other means of 
incorporating context and environment into the knowledge process, so that explicit 
knowledge generated is not improperly stored.  The tactical unit has a product based on 
properly constructed explicit knowledge.  Because of the intelligence and knowledge that 
is imparted by the MTAC, the visiting command can better train with near realistic 
suppositions.  This reliable product then can be used as a basis to construct a pre-plan, 
and ultimately, an adequate COA.   
B. USE OF KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS IN FORCE PROTECTION 
The MTAC will be home for the main KBS of the AT/FP system.  In Figure 5, 
this KBS is represented as the MTAC Archive.  This mainly technological system must 
be a well crafted and thoroughly organized system that guarantees reliable storage, file 
organization, and retrieval.  It should have the ability to query by different regions, 
environmental conditions, force sizes, force types, threat conditions, planned COA, 
actions taken, mistakes, and to address other considerations stipulated by the MTAC 
analysts.  The KBS should be robust and detailed enough so that the MTAC analysts are 
given a powerful mining tool with which to work.  It is axiomatic that after-action 
reports, though involving tedious and time consuming processes, should not be 
underused.  This system should be networked based in order to speed the sending and 
receiving of forms and reports from the different units and agents.  This system will 
provide for standardization of certain specific condition forms and reports and thus aid in 
the storage and organization of the KBS. 
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Although the inclusion of such a robust system is necessary, the human 
component within that system needs to be further defined.  A completely automated KBS 
is not the solution that will give the fleet commanders a better knowledge of the port 
environment they will be visiting.  It is the combination of these queries with human 
analysis and interpretation that yields useful and applicable knowledge.  IDSEA’s 
knowledge management system joins human interaction with automated processes and 
practices in order to achieve a detailed, focused result.  By updating the learning 
objectives, IDSEA can modify the information structure and refine the search criteria.  
Both of these changes help redefine the focused results.  It is the cognition of the analysts 
that will ultimately produced the desired results. 
 
Figure 6.   IDSEA Knowledge Management System Flow Chart 
Open source gathering of information was used sporadically by most intelligence 
organizations prior to the events of September 11, 2001.  By combining the open and 
closed sources through a structured extraction, a KBS can contextually apply certain open 
sources for use with AT/FP.  This use of both classified and unclassified materials saves 
the command’s force protection personnel processing time.  In the current system a ship’s 
FPO and wardroom are processing most of the open source mining.  If this fusion of open 
and closed resources is assumed by the MTAC, specifically the KBS, this practice will 
relieve some of the research and processing work of personnel afloat.  
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Figure 7.   Use of Open and Closed Sources in an Information System 
 
C. SCHACHER PROCESS ANALYSIS AND REPRESENTATION 
1. Horizontal Scope Analysis  
In order to keep knowledge current and complete, an entity’s explicit knowledge 
base must be challenged constantly by exposure to a number of tacit experiences and by 
inculcating those parts deemed new and relevant.  Therefore, the Schacher process 
incorporates the four processes illustrated in Figure 2 in order to insure that this system 
does not asymptotically degenerate into a level of uselessness.  The following four 
sections analyze how the Schacher proposal incorporates the SECI processes.  It should 
be noted that all processes are not solely tacit or explicit but do involve a blending of the 
two. 
a. Tacit to Explicit Knowledge Flow 
Figure 1 reveals that a ship pulling out from a port visit is at the height of 
its tacit understanding of the environment.  It is well habituated to the practices and COA 
required to work and exist in the port environment.  An after-action report provides a way 
to externalize that knowledge into something explicit.  After any port visit, this report 
provides a means for reflection on the effectiveness of the force protection plan 
implemented and includes recommendations for similar future visits.  In the lessons 
learned portion of the report quality explicit knowledge is potentially generated.  The unit 
making the visit and the local agents assisting with the call each generate these reports.  
The visiting command provides most of the courses of action and plans to be executed 
along with their results.  These are the processes that will be under scrutiny to determine 
the effectiveness of their implementation.  The local agents assisting the command are 
crucial to this externalization process because they bear the burden of fulfilling the 
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conditions portion for the report.  This environmental context that must be incorporated 
to help the MTAC analysts determine cause and effect relationships.  This contextual 
inclusion enhances the credibility of the explicit knowledge base because it becomes 
environmentally dependent and relevant.  These reports are then transmitted to the 
MTAC Archive where they enter the KBS.   
b. Explicit to Explicit Knowledge Flow 
One of the main purposes of the MTAC is to ensure that explicit 
knowledge is combined with other knowledge to ensure a unified understanding of a 
certain environment.  Having a central processing and storage center makes this 
combination of knowledge easier for the MTAC analysts.  The KBS at the MTAC should 
be the primary means for the storage and organization of this knowledge.  Experts can 
recognize patterns, communicate trends, and investigate coincidences from different 
regions.  This process is included on Schacher’s diagram as the MTAC’s preparing the 
“change form”.  This human and technological knowledge system provides the analysts 
with resources needed to combine and organize relevant knowledge.  The ongoing 
monitoring of the explicit knowledge base links and networks resources to ensure that the 
MTAC’s archive unifies all available threat assessment knowledge.  Effectively 
managing the KBS and inter-networking with regional specialists ensure that the explicit 
knowledge base is not degraded over time.  This assimilation is designed to ensure that 
those analysts charged with making the knowledge product for the visiting units are 
properly equipped with the intelligence and understanding needed to make an accurate 
threat assessment. 
c. Explicit to Tacit Knowledge Flow 
Internalization is perhaps the most complex and subtle of the four 
knowledge flow transition processes.  It is dependent on communication, distribution, and 
organized dissemination.  Even the most complete and organized explicit knowledge base 
would be ineffective without it.  The MTAC begins the internalization of the explicit 
knowledge when it forwards the pre-plan to the FPO afloat.  Having drawn upon the 
resources available at MTAC, the planners provide recommendations and complete 
extraction of relevant explicit knowledge to be used in the command.  The knowledge 
product that is delivered to the FPO and decision makers afloat are designed to convey 
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the understanding achieved thus far the in the knowledge construction process.  A 
product of focused researched results emerges.  The naval unit uses this knowledge to 
build its training program and force protection plan.  The units using the MTAC’s 
product should be able to operationalize the knowledge into an effective training 
program. Ultimately through this training and reorganization, the crew of the naval unit 
conducting the port visit will internalize this imparted knowledge. The actual product 
delivered is discussed later in this section. 
d. Tacit to Tacit Knowledge Flow 
Once the pre-plan has been forwarded to the decision makers, the tactical 
level planning begins.  FPO and commanders formulate a comprehensive and knowledge-
driven training program using the latest intelligence reports.  It is the use of the MTAC’s 
report as a basis for pre-planning that propels the creation of this force protection 
knowledge system.  Using the pre-plan as a guidance tool, the FPO socializes and 
networks with the local NCIS agents and other intelligence sources to keep appraised of 
the current situation and conditions.  Questions about certain specific information should 
be gathered from those sources in the geographic region.  This HUMINT provides FPO 
with accurate first hand knowledge.  Also, if another ship is rendezvousing in the same 
region, a social network should be established to appraise each command of preparations 
and plans.  Consistency of plans and tactical situational awareness will further strengthen 
the group’s unity of effort and will prevent certain miscommunication.  During the port 
visit, the naval unit will see the results of a certain implemented COA.  The ‘on the spot’ 
decisions and actions taken as a result of conditions encountered is also part of the 
socialization process.  Communicating optimal plans to other vessels or commands in the 
region is a means of ensuring that tacit knowledge used is disseminated.   
2. Vertical Scope Analysis 
The supportive processes of organization, formalization, and distribution are 
interwoven in the MTAC’s KBS functioning.  In the KBS section of Chapter III and 
Section B of this chapter, it was asserted that proper organization and filing of forms, 
reports and conditions are fundamental to explicit knowledge credibility.  Proper forms 
must be created in order to ensure useful storage and retrieval.  These forms must be 
dynamic in order to change or be updated with new conditions.  The networked structure 
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of the MTAC also aids in the speed and consistency of the information and knowledge.  
It also codifies and formalizes the knowledge base.  Through structured queries and 
extraction, the knowledge from the KBS is coupled with the analysts’ cognitive reasoning 
in order to make sense of the current conditions of an area under scrutiny.  It combines 
the current conditions and new information with human reason in order to focus the 
results.  The culmination of the formulization process is the creation of the threat analysis 
product or pre-plan.  This pre-plan will be forwarded to the visiting unit and its ISIC.  
The security and integrity of this pre-plan and the knowledge product is dependent upon 
the network used.  Planners rely on the design values of redundancy, security, and 
integrity to ensure that this plan makes it to the units uncontaminated.  The distribution 
process is the last supportive process of the knowledge flow system.  From it, all other 
processes use of the product created. 
The performative processes of application, evolution, and creation are inherently 
combined with the human interaction and use of the KBS.  The product delivered by 
MTAC is developed into the command’s COA.  The command takes into consideration 
the received knowledge and applies it to the situation at hand.  The plan is tested 
practically in training exercises and events leading up to the port visit.  FPO, 
commanders, and the ISIC all are responsible for any modifications to the force 
protection plan.  Tacit knowledge accumulation increases once the training cycle begins.  
Once the ship is in port, the knowledge creation process is accelerated.  Tacit knowledge 
increases as the duration of the visit extends.  Reports and observations are made in order 
to generate complete and detailed after-action reports.  The explicit knowledge creation 
process begins with the combination of past events coupled with the present conditions.  
Thus the cycle of knowledge creation from an operational point of view continues. 
3. Contextual Analysis 
Schacher has formulated processes that include environmental conditions and 
contexts.  In the after-action report creation process, the old knowledge or past event is 
coupled with the conditions to which the knowledge is subjected.  New knowledge is 
formalized and constructed in the face of new conditions or events.  Past events and 
circumstances are stored in the MTAC archive as the old knowledge base is joined to the 
current conditions and events through human interaction.  It is the KBS, the union of man 
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and machine that prepares the change form.  Through this system, human cognition is 
joined to the immense search and processing power of information retrieval systems.  It is 
done only with respect to the conditions for which it can be applied.  The training cycle 
or application and evolution processes use updated environmental conditions gathered 
through networking with NCIS agents and other visiting ships.  Throughout the major 
knowledge handling processes in the Schacher proposal, context is consistently weighed 
and examined to ensure that a level of credibility is attached to the knowledge used.  This 
process verifies that the knowledge used results from all conditions of context.  The 
Schacher proposal is designed to include contextual and environmental inputs. 
D. KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS AND ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY 
The MTAC and systems surrounding the protection of naval forces require a 
robust and extensive absorptive capacity.  They must be dynamic enough to keep pace 
with the ever-changing port environments.  By identifying the different properties of 
ACAP within the MTAC and AT/FP knowledge flow system, the planners will be able to 
concentrate on improving those practices.   
1. Acquisition 
Schacher proposes a few different areas from which acquisition of new 
knowledge and information can be derived.  Events that occur daily define the nature and 
patterns within a society and culture.  Knowledge of them is needed to better define and 
codify the knowledge about that area.  Other than the NCIS agents’ daily gathering and 
sending of information back to the MTAC, acquisition processes in Schacher’s system 
are limited.  This might not allow for a dynamic ACAP for this proposed system. 
However, the IDSEA knowledge management system does offer a greater use of 
acquisition processes and could incorporate some of these ideas into Schacher’s proposal.  
The mining tools used to extract data and information from open sources is an example of 
an acquisition process.  Establishing the different learning objectives defines an 
information structure and helps in the formulation of the data capture plan.  It also is a 
basis for the search criteria.  Therefore, the processes involved in shaping the learning 
objectives are indirectly a data and information acquisition plan.  Because of the different 
ways in which the acquisition of new information can occur, the IDSEA KM system has 
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a fairly dynamic ACAP.  It is flexible enough to shape and respond to changing 
circumstances. 
2. Assimilation 
Once a system embraces new information and knowledge, it must assimilate 
constructs and other information and knowledge in order to be used.  In Schacher’s plan, 
tactical units assimilate after-action reports from the past events and environmental 
conditions.  It is the combination of these two inputs that helps to create a useful report.  
Also, the MTAC is able to assimilate new events and information with current conditions 
joining them into new knowledge.  The cognition portion of Figure 4 is an illustration of 
the assimilation process.  Therefore, Schacher’s plan appears fairly robust in the 
assimilation of the information and knowledge once it is in the system.   
3. Transformation 
Transforming knowledge within a system is difficult task and determines how 
valuable the MTAC will be.  In making the pre-plan and the formulating the knowledge 
product, MTAC analysts have to interact with local, regional, and global information and 
knowledge systems.  By comparing reports, analyzing patterns, and establishing trends, 
subject matter experts and other MTAC workers are able to have a more comprehensive 
understanding of the knowledge at hand.  In seeing knowledge through different schema 
and from different points of view, the analysts are expected to form a more informed and 
complete threat analysis.  Transformation is a key process in establishing the usability of 
knowledge within this system.  The idea of centralizing the knowledge organization and 
formalization processes helps to broaden the ACAP process of transformation. 
4. Exploitation 
The pre-plan and knowledge product that are created must be actualized 
practically to be effectively useful.  The revision process involves using of the given 
product, but it does not constitute full exploitation of the product.  The extent to which 
the pre-plan and knowledge product is used to formulate a productive and sufficient COA 
will be the determining factor on how well the pre-plan and knowledge product are 
exploited.  A review of the exploitation of the knowledge product might come from the 
formulation of the after-action reports, for these reports call upon the past events and 
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conditions surrounding an event.  Therefore how much of the effective portions of the 
COA used had its origins in the pre-plan and the knowledge product will help determine 
how much the product was exploited. 
E. SUMMARY 
Once the MTAC is established and operational, an audit should be done of its 
processes and practices to ensure that they contribute to the creation or management of 
knowledge.  Because the different stakeholders in the AT/FP problem rely on the MTAC 
to efficiently produce a complete knowledge product, the structure and organizational 
design of the center should be closely monitored.  If a static AT/FP system or one with a 
low ACAP is implemented, the government may be faced with another stovepipe system 
that is unable to grasp the scope of the problem at hand.  MTAC planners and organizers 
must be well versed in the processes surrounding ACAP.  The force protection system 
must be a model of efficient flows of information and knowledge.  This organizational 
idea is a key function in the AT/FP threat assessment system.  Therefore MTAC and 






























A. SUMMARY OF KNOWLEDGE FLOW SYSTEMS 
 The AT/FP’s real tasks are that of knowledge construction and management.  The 
different stakeholders and organizations associated with this problem play different but 
equally vital roles.  The MTAC, which is currently in its forming stages, is designed to be 
the primary knowledge assimilating system.  Those charged with defining and 
establishing the AT/FP systems and structures should be knowledgeable and up-to-date 
on the current discussions in the knowledge creation and management discussions.  This 
paper should at least motivate further research and discussion into the appraisal of AT/FP 
systems with regards to knowledge constructs.  To be of value to the fleet, the MTAC 
must be organized in an orderly fashion.  Complete definition of roles, responsibilities, 
missions, and products must be established. Qualified analysts and subject matter experts 
must be employed to run the KBS at the MTAC. 
Gordon Schacher’s proposal gives the MTAC planners a working plan or outline 
that can be developed and refined.  He has included processes and entities that are 
important for the creation, organization, formalization, distribution, application, and 
evolution of knowledge.  The ACAP processes and practices of his system provide an 
ideal blueprint for a dynamic and modern system that is capable of keeping pace with the 
world it seeks to understand.  With further studies and future research those planners 
entrusted with the institution of this knowledge flow system should become involved in 
examining the different aspects of knowledge construction and management.  Different 
frameworks and schema can be used to analyze the AT/FP problem.  
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. A Study on the Dimensions of Knowledge  
This paper looked at the explicit/tacit dimension of knowledge as it pertains to the 
AT/FP problem.  There are many different knowledge dimensions that are essential to the 
contemplation of this problem.  Complexity, utility, embedded knowledge, and other 
categories must be included in the research.  Viewing this problem through the different 
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dimensions of knowledge will be beneficial, because this is a knowledge management 
problem and needs to be treated as such.   
2. A Vertical Analysis of the KMLCM 
Once the MTAC has been created and processes and systems have been 
established, an appraisal of those process and practices using the KMLC model would 
yield a study with meaning.  It would assist those leaders and managers of the MTAC in 
gauging the efficiency and productivity of the MTAC.  The effectiveness and utility of 
those organization processes identified as not aiding one of the processes of creation, 
organization, formalization, distribution, application, and evolution should be questioned.   
3. The MTAC Knowledge Product 
The MTAC’s ultimate goal is to produce a knowledge product capable of aiding 
those naval units traveling through or to a particular region.  There are of course different 
debates about what this product should be.  Because many officers worldwide will view 
the MTAC product and because humans learn differently, this product must be lenient 
enough to provide a degree of tailored access.  As hinted in the second chapter, I 
recommend a product that combines both technical and social assets in an effort to codify 
this knowledge.   
Using the latest technological assets available, a networked based, XML-
generated three-dimensional graphical user interface should be constructed of the port 
region.  This physical simulated environment will allow the user to go above, on, and 
below the water line to view the physical region from different angles.  This layout will 
allow the user to gain the imagery necessary to plan force protection measures like 
personnel positioning, perimeter establishment, and force protection weapons deployment 
zones.  However, this file would impart only a physical knowledge of the region.  It does 
not take into consideration such environmental aspects such as social trends, religious 
movements, historical events, and political conditions.  Therefore some networking based 
solution will be needed in order to capture the dynamic nature of these other conditions.  
Force protection officers should have the ability to contact the NCIS ashore agents and 
subject matter experts at the MTAC to satisfy questions.   
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For the aspects other than environmental, different maps can be constructed to 
show a region’s ethnic dispersion, its economic conditions, its criminal problems, and its 
‘safe-havens.’  The inclusion of reports about the area along with these maps will better 
translate the knowledge from the MTAC to the individual units.  Having this file reside 
on a MTAC server will allow those ships the ability to access the file as needed.  It will 
be updated by MTAC when new developments arise in a particular region.  This will 
ensure that whenever a visiting command accesses the server, it will receive the most up 
to date file available.  The ISIC will have access to the file and can make direct input into 
its unit’s COA.    
4. Vulnerabilities in the Force Protection Knowledge Flow Life Cycle 
Managers of the AT/FP system must recognize how practice and process provide 
particular services to the knowledge flow system.  The force will be threatened by any 
misunderstanding of certain roles that different groups should fulfill.  Therefore, defined 
roles, missions, and responsibilities of certain segments or processes are key to a full 
understanding of the system.  The vulnerabilities of the system must be documented so 
that special care can be taken to avoid them.  
To protect the knowledge flow cycle against disinformation and knowledge 
corruption, every effort should be made to attach context to relative specific knowledge.  
Whenever this is not done, less useful knowledge could be overemphasized and could 
lead to an “information/knowledge overload.” 
5. Considerations for Testing of MTAC and AT/FP Procedures 
IDSEA has conducted two LOE’s that have sought to test the AT/FP plans and 
procedures.  Every effort should be made to ensure that these tests are extensive and 
strenuous enough to try the many different aspects of the MTAC and its components.  
These experiments should not only test the immediate task of protecting the force, but 
also test the knowledge system’s ability to locate, process, and use selected data and 
information.  The use of Information Operations such as psychological operations, 
disinformation, and influence should be used to see how well our forces respond to such 
measures.  Not all tests should end in success and likewise should not all result in a ‘blue’ 
defeat.   
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Effort and time should be spent testing the knowledge processes discussed, and 
testing the ability of the AT/FP system to adapt to change (i.e. test its ACAP).  Each 
process that helps create, organize, formulate, etc. knowledge should be defined and 
scrutinized to ensure the usefulness of that process.  Special tests should be conducted to 
help determine how well the AT/FP system responds to various loads of information and 
knowledge in order to attempt to gauge its absorptive capacity.  It must take detailed 
exercises like these to ensure that the system is not institutionalized by the mistakes made 
after implementation.   
C.  PARTING THOUGHTS 
In investigating the many aspects of AT/FP I remain convinced that proper and 
sufficient group training is necessary to ensure any successful port visit.  The tacit 
knowledge gained from interacting with sailors who stand watches strengthens the 
command’s ability to protect itself.  Even with battlespace knowledge superiority, the 
tactical units will have to rely on the training of the crew.  It is their performance in 
distressful situations that oftentimes determines the success of an engagement.  Sailors 
should look not only for troublesome situations while in port, but should expect the 
unexpected.  Incidents should be reported through their chain of command.  The most 
reliable form of intelligence gathering is HUMINT.  It should be utilized locally to gain 
the first-hand knowledge of the area.  However, with all the proper foresight and threat 
assessment, there must be a strong and competent force ready to met the dynamic 
challenges of the port environment. 
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